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Are there rules capturing the meaning of all possible uses (now, past, and future) of the
word “chair”? Ludwig Wittgenstein raised this issue in Section 80 of the Philosophical
Investigations where he stated: “I say, ‘There is a chair over there’”. Does “chair” in his
utterance mean anything? For myself, this question can be approached autobiographically and
chronologically. As a youngster, my earliest understanding of “chair” is reflected in the graphic
illustration from a Dick and Jane reader (Figure 1) with re-imagined dialog: “This is a chair”. I
understood a chair to be a human-made object — usually constructed from wood — in which to
sit, and having parts readily identifiable as “seat”, “back”, and “legs”.

Figure 1. Dick: “This is a chair”.

I want to say that Wittgenstein’s statement: “I say, ‘There is a chair over there’” resonates fully
with my early understanding of “chair” albeit that Wittgenstein may in fact have indicated a
chair with “arms” or one, perhaps, covered in fabric or leather. Had I been there, I am reasonably
confident that I would have known what Wittgenstein meant by “I say, ‘There is a chair over
there’”. Without such confidence, I would have a very difficult time navigating our world.
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We might reasonably leave things at this point, where everyday speech is concerned, but
Wittgenstein pushed onward:
What if I go to fetch it [i.e., the chair], and it suddenly disappears from
sight? — “So it wasn’t a chair, but some kind of illusion.” — But a few seconds
later, we see it again and are able to touch it, and so on. — “So the chair was there
after all, and its disappearance was some kind of illusion.” — But suppose that
after a time it disappears again — or seems to disappear. What are we to say
now? Have you rules ready for such cases — rules saying whether such a thing is
still to be called a “chair”?
In ways similar to Wittgenstein’s thought experiment, we can indeed encounter subsequent
situations that test (or differ dramatically from) our earliest understandings of a word, in this case
the word “chair”, and it is my purpose here to illustrate several such examples.
The Illusory Chair
Wittgenstein observed that the disappearing chair might be “some kind of illusion” and
such is the case when magicians make a person sitting in a chair “vanish” (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Making a person in a chair “vanish”. YouTube video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1YlZxDUP8X8
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Key here, however, is that the person in question does not actually disappear (in the sense of
evaporating into thin air or escaping into some unseen dimension of hyper-space) but is only
made to do so by conjuring or slight of hand, by virtue of a “trick”. Variations on this theme
include examples in which parts of chairs seem to have disappeared (Figures 3 and 4):

Figure 3.

Figure 4.

But, there are no lasting mysteries here. In Figure 3, the “missing pieces” have simply been
replaced with clear plastic elements, as viewers can clearly see on second glance. In Figure 4,
however, the apparently missing pieces really are missing; in fact, the upper portion of the steel
chair is supported by a single leg welded to a large steel plate hidden below the carpet, the
illusion as a whole being a sculptural trompe l’œil.
Playing with Scale
It is fair to say that my youthful understanding of “chair” presumed that chairs as I understood
them then were for the use of normal-sized human beings. That chairs could be made very much
larger (Figure 5) or smaller (Figure 6) had not yet entered my imagination or experience as it
would later when enjoying the comedic performances of Lily Tomlin, encountering doll houses,
or viewing the interior decorations of the miniature rooms at the Art Institute of Chicago (Figure
7).
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Figure 5. Enormous chair.

Figure 6. Miniature chair for doll house.

Figure 7. Guide to miniature rooms at Art Institute.
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Chairs That Do Unexpected Things
My initial understanding of “chair” included the background assumption of stability, not
only did chairs not “disappear”, neither did they move in unexpected ways: collapsing (as do
folding chairs, Figure 8), rock (as with a rocking chair, Figure 9), race (as do racing wheelchairs,
Figure 10), bounce (Figure 11), or elevate (Figure 12):

Figure 8. Folding chairs.
.

Figure 10. Racing wheelchair.

Figure 9. Rocking chair.
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Figure 11. Bouncing chair (note the spring).

Figure 12. Elevating chair.

Extreme Properties
If chairs in my youthful experience did not collapse, rock, race, bounce, or elevate,
neither did they assume the extreme properties of flying (see especially the YouTube video:
https://youtu.be/QlKC5qUS80o, Figure 13), killing (electric chair, figure 14), or talking (as did
“Chairee” in Pee Wee Herman’s Playhouse, Figure 15):
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Figure 13. Flying Chair.
.

Figure 15. “Chairee”.
Figure 14. Electric chair.
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Unusable Chairs
Chairs in my youth also had the presumption of everyday utility, one could sit on them.
Not so, the following examples (Figures 16 and 17):

Figure 16. Chair with spikes.
Figure 17. An unusable chair.
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Artful Chairs
Conceiving of chairs as “art” rather than fulfilling
primarily quotidian purposes (e.g., providing places for
people to sit) was beyond my ken as a child.2 It was only
later on that I learned that the conceptualizing of welldesigned and/or attention-grabbing but `nonetheless
functional chairs can keep industrial designers very busy
(e.g., Byars, 2006; Cranz, 2000; Eidelberg, Hine,
Kirkham, Hanks and Peatross, 2006; and Fiell, 2017).
Gerrit Rietveld’s essentially one-legged Zig Zag chair
(Figure 18) cleverly straddled the boundary between
functionality, on the one hand, and art, on the other. The
chairs in Figures 3, 4, 16 and 17 (above) also fall into the
category of art for art’s sake, as did most of the chairs in
Max Lamb’s recent exhibition at the Art Institute of
Chicago (Figures 19 and 20).

Figure 18. Zig Zag Chair.

.

Figure 19. Max Lamb, “Forge
chair”.
Figure 20. Max Lamb, “From my grandfather’s tree”.
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Animate Chairs
The chairs of my youth were presumptively
inanimate objects; not so the one in Figure 21 made by
carefully tending, bending and shaping living branches
over time .

Figure 21. A living chair.

Playing with Chairs
I learned in grade school that games, like musical chairs, could be played with chairs (Figure
22):

Figure 22. Adult office workers playing musical chairs.
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Only later did I come to appreciate word games, like making puns, that can be played with
words, as in contrasting “department chair” (figure 23) with “chair department” (figure 24):

Figure 23. Michael Weisberg,
Department Chair, Philosophy,
University of Pennsylvania.

Figure 24. Chair Department, The Office Outlet (A Herman Miller Source), Zeeland, Michigan.
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Figure 25. The Gump, tied to a chaise lounge, from
the Wizard of Oz series, by Frank Baum.
Another pun: A “Gump Chair”3 (from the Wizard of Oz series, Figure 25) and “Gump in a
Chair” (from the motion picture, Forest Gump, starring Tom Hanks, Figure 26):

Figure 26. Tom Hanks as Forest Gump (O.K., it’s a bench, not
a chair, but you get the point).
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On the Concept of a Chair
Considering a chair as a concept occurred sometime after grade school. It is something
that designers do frequently. One of the questions in thinking of a chair as a concept is trying to
think through the point at which a chair is no longer a chair. For example, if a major
characteristic of a chair is the idea that one “sits” in a chair, then what are we to make of a chair
that reclines, to the point that we are lying prone, and no longer sitting – has the chair become a
bed? (Figures 27 and 28):

Figure 27. Chair bed.
Figure 28. Chair bed, extended for sleeping.

But, isn’t a dental chair always a chair, no matter how prone we might be? (Figure 29):

Figure 29. Dentist’s chair, upright position.
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And, how many people can sit in a chair, and still call it a chair? Two-person chairs, or “cuddle
chairs”, are not totally unknown (Figure 30 illustrates a whimsical design), and are more
typically configured as “settees”.

Figure 30. Rocking chair for two.
But what about the case of several people? As a youngster, I spent most Sunday mornings in my
father’s church, where many people sat on long benches generally called “pews” (Figure 31).
But the question arises, if one builds a pew for a single person (Figure 32), doesn’t it effectively
cease to be a “pew” and become a “chair”? (This is a point of some discussion in our household;
my life-partner contends that a pew made for one person is still a pew). 4

Figure 31. Church pews.
Figure 32. Pew for one person.
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And, in reply to Jim Matson’s observation5 that a hippopotamus cannot be a chair, isn’t it just
possible, conceptually speaking, that a hippo could at least function practically as a chair?
(Figure 30):

Figure 33. “Lotus” the hippopotamus, Krasl Art Center, St. Joseph, Michigan.

And, finally, is a physical object even necessary to
conceive of a chair? Figures 34 and 35 document the
formation of “the world’s longest human chair”
during a 2012 event in Japan, wherein large numbers
of people sat in the lap of a another person, forming a
long, sequential “chair”. And, when the participants
stand up, doesn’t the “chair” disappear?

Figure 34. Human chairs.
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Figure 35. The world’s longest human chair, Japan, 2012.

The Consequences of Unanticipated Chairs
I hope I have demonstrated that I have traveled some distance since my first Dick and
Jane understanding of “chair”. This is not a complete or comprehensive survey, of course, nor
does it include any possible future understandings of which I am currently unaware. The
question now is “So what”? Wittgenstein made this issue explicit in Section 80 of his
Philosophical Investigations when he asked, after having introduced the case of the disappearing
chair:
And are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word [i.e.,
“chair”], because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?
That is, when I understood — as a youth — a chair to be a human-made object — constructed
usually from wood — in which to sit, and having parts readily identified as “seat”, “back”, and
“legs” and had not yet imagined disappearing chairs, flying chairs, unusable chairs, conceptual
chairs, etc., etc., was I confused or gravely mistaken in thinking I knew or understood what a
“chair” was? I think the obvious answer is a resounding “No!”. Clearly, within the context of
my situation and my form of life, I knew what a “chair” was, and used the word appropriately.
To answer otherwise implies that I can never know/understand what I mean by my words or
what you mean by your words.
The consequences are significant, not just for me but for every language user. For
example, when Ptolemy spoke about the “Sun”, did he not know what he was saying (and did his
listeners not know what he meant) because Ptolemy and his listeners were ignorant of the
meaning that Copernicus would subsequently give to the word “Sun”. Is it the case then that
language is inherently incomplete? I am tempted to say “Yes”, but it is the wrong question.
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What would a “complete” language look like, by comparison? I do not think anyone knows (I
certainly do not, and — despite giving it the old college try — the Oxford English Dictionary is
by no means “complete”), and thus we cannot know if language in some holistic or universal
sense is necessarily incomplete. There is no standard for comparison and thus for determining if
a language is “incomplete”.
What we can say is that languages and language usages change from time to time and
place to place, sometimes making reference to vastly different circumstances and customs. My
earlier Dick and Jane understanding of “chair” was useful at the time, and was in that useful
sense “complete” in that I did not then confront other situations or phenomena to which the word
“chair” could be meaningfully applied. What is more, that earlier understanding still serves
pretty well in the majority of everyday situations (I do know what is meant if someone who is
tired of standing asks me to bring them a chair). As humans, we have the capacity for language,
speech, and communication (with Helen Keller being an instructive limiting case) and this, if
Wittgenstein is taken seriously, is something to examine closely.6
Endnotes
1. Please direct communications to Michael R. Hill, Associate Director, Jane Addams Research
Center: mhill@JaneAddamsResearchCenter.org
2. Intriguingly, Amy Elder (personal communication) recalls having read that “artists talk about
Wittgenstein at least as much as philosophers do.” This suggests an exciting “lateral” dimension
for further exploration.
3. I am indebted to Mary Jo Deegan for this suggestion (personal communication). For further
illumination, see Deegan (1989).
4. Lin Atnip (personal communication) reminds us of the following passage in Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations:
241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is
false?” — It is what human beings say that is true and false, and they agree in the
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.
That is, it is in language that we can talk about what a “chair” is; it is our form of life (and what
we can sit on) that forms the basis for the discussion.
5. Jim Matson, in class discussion. Thank you Jim for jogging loose my memory of Burt Brent’s
hippopotamus sculpture at the Krasl Art Center. The Krasl’s promotional material invites:
Go ahead, take a seat! The Heavyweight was commissioned for Krasl Art
Center’s sculpture garden in 1994. From the beginning, the sculpture was
intended to be welcoming and interactive. Each year, hundreds of children and
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adults climb on, stand on, sit on, and hug the 800-pound hippo now known as
Lotus.
6. I am indebted to Charles Elder (personal communication) for reminding us that at least the
following issues (embedded in the essay) must be clearly distinguished when thinking about
Section 80: (1) Knowing what a chair is; (2) Being able to say what a chair is; (3) Being able to
use the word “chair”; (4) Having rules for the application of the word “chair”; and (5) Having
rules to cover every possible application of the word “chair.”
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